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Gaza at the margins? Legibility and
indeterminacy in the Israel-Palestine
conﬂict
Despite prominent attention to the nature of the state in the social sciences, the place of
language in creating and maintaining the state remains an emerging area of research. The
analysis that follows investigates indeterminacy and illegibility in messages disseminated by
the Israeli military in the Gaza Strip. This analysis highlights the ways in which linguistic
indeterminacy is used as a tool by the state in controlling populations at its margins, while
investigating the role of language in reproducing the state through the circulation of texts.
Introduction: Important statement for the residents of the Gaza Strip1
For decades, state-sponsored violence has been an area of major concern withinhuman rights circles. Law and political science scholars have treated stateviolence through analyses of the legality and efﬁcacy of state methods, while at
the same time historians have re-analyzed periods of state violence, at times
challenging ofﬁcial state discourses (see Levine 2005; Morris 2008; and Papp!e 2006 for
the case relevant to this analysis). Anthropologists have also contributed to
investigating the effects of violence in daily life (e.g. Green 1999; Scheper-Hughes
1993) and various forms of violence in relation to the state (Das et al 2000). However,
engagement from within linguistic anthropology on language within systems of
violence remains an emerging area of research (Faudree 2012; Gavriely-Nuri 2013;
Hodges 2011). One potential site of linguistic anthropological engagement with
broader anthropological discussions on violence is analysis of the forms of
communication that take place between state militaries and civilians in conﬂict. This
type of analysis highlights how language and violence intersect, along with the
means by which language becomes one part of a larger constellation of methods used
to reproduce and reinforce the sovereignty of the state itself.
Communicative acts between states and civilians in war manifest in a variety of
different forms. In the Gaza Strip – the geo-political context at the center of this study
– these acts take the form of SMS messages and phone calls sent by Israeli intelligence
ofﬁcers through Gazan telecommunications networks and military leaﬂets dropped
over Gaza (Tawil-Soury 2013; Weizman 2009a, 2009b). These forms of discourse
represent direct methods of communication between the military, as an extension of
the state, and Palestinian civilians in Gaza. However, this communication only
travels top-down, from abstracted state structures to civilians in war.
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The analysis that follows investigates textual indeterminacy (Falk-Moore 1978,
Irvine 1996, Jaffe 2009) in the participant frameworks of SMS messages and leaﬂets
disseminated by the Israeli military within the context of the three most recent rounds
of violence in the Gaza Strip: Operation Cast Lead (2008-9), Operation Pillar of
Defense (2012), and Operation Protective Edge (2014). My analysis begins with a
seven-word SMS message sent by the military to a resident of Gaza during Operation
Pillar of Defense. Through the SMS message we establish the initial layers of
indeterminacy that are then built upon by the subsequent analysis of a series of
military leaﬂets used in Gaza.
The textual data presented in this study was collected from varied international
news organizations including NBC, Maan, and Haaretz, all of whom reported on the
three most recent outbreaks of full ﬂedged conﬂict in Gaza. As one component of
their reporting, news outlets regularly publish the texts (often as photographs) of
leaﬂets or SMS messages when writing about the development of the conﬂict. In
addition, the Israeli Defense Forces, on its ofﬁcial website and blog, regularly publish
copies of leaﬂets dropped over Gaza.
Gaza represents an unfortunately well-suited case study for the type of analysis
that I present below. Near continual cycles of military conﬂict in the Strip have
created a situation in which discourses about these conﬂicts circulate (Spitulnik 1997)
in both local and international media and in daily discourse(s) in Israel and the
Occupied Palestinian Territories (Gavriely-Nuri 2013). Additionally, the Israeli state
has been involved in more military conﬂicts than any other Western state following
the Second World War (Gavriely-Nuri 2015, 4). Due to the heightened attention the
Israel-Palestine conﬂict receives, the frequency with which conﬂict takes place, and
the undeniable power imbalance between belligerents in the conﬂict, an atmosphere
exists where communication between the military and civilians has become
commonplace. Beyond its commonality in this context, I argue that language has
become a central tool in managing not only conﬂict but the ways in which the Israeli
state solidiﬁes itself as a recognized democracy within the international community.
In the analysis below, leaﬂets and SMS messages are presented in transliterated
Arabic alongside an English translation carried out based on the photographed
copies of these texts that were reported in the media. These examples were chosen for
their wide circulation in international media, the quality of the documentation of the
texts themselves, and because they highlight the broad range of indeterminacies that
are present in these forms of military-to-civilian communication in Gaza, providing a
more holistic view of the role of language in one of the world’s most enduring
conﬂicts. Beyond these textual examples, ﬁeldwork that I conducted in the Gaza Strip
in 2013, six months after Operation Pillar of Defense and just over a year before
Operation Protective Edge, provides an ethnographic backdrop for these discursive
acts.
My aim in analyzing a speciﬁc set of texts, from a single context, is to show how
language can be utilized by states and their ancillaries in times of conﬂict. But
beyond simply examining the ways in which a given state or its military uses
language, what this analysis offers us is a way to understand how language
traverses the margins of the state and can serve as a source of political and social
power in the maintenance of sovereignty. As this analysis shows, in Gaza the
margins of the state are penetrated with discourses that create a vision of an Israeli
state that appears wildly illegible (Das 2004; Das and Poole 2004) and contradictory
to civilians caught in ﬁghting. The textual representations of the state analyzed
below are shot through, to draw on Bakhtin’s (1981) turn of phrase, with
indeterminacies that come in the form of ambiguity and unusable information that
challenges the forms of order and rationality that have been treated as hallmarks of
the state (Das and Poole 2004, 5).
While in contrast, at a national or international level, the state uses the marginality
of Gaza and the language of these texts to ascribe notions of democratic order,
legality, and humanitarianism to the state. The result is a duality where the state is
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rendered both legible and illegible, while Gaza is continually situated as the location
of disorder, a space in which the state must necessarily impose itself (Das and Poole
2004, 6). However, by examining these representations of the state we see that despite
attempts to keep it at its margins, Gaza and the “forms of illegibility, partial
belonging, and disorder that seem to inhabit the margins of the state” (Das and Poole
2004, 6) ultimately constitute a necessary condition of the Israeli state as both a
theoretical and political object. At the same time, as Tawil-Soury and Matar have
described, Gaza is unique in that it continually reinstates its centrality, providing “a
vivid and painful contemporary example of the violence and enmity of modern
warfare (2016, 2).
From the Requerimiento to Gaza
While situating language in modern military conﬂict may represent a relatively
novel area of interest, analyses of language within the context of state violence are
not new. The Spanish Requerimiento (Hanke 1949; Helps 1971) is one of a number
of cases where state actors that have utilized language in framing, threatening,
and ultimately carrying out acts of violence. As Faudree notes (2012, 182-83), the
Requerimiento were a collection of written texts used by the Spanish to formalize
their conquest of the Americas. The texts formally demanded that indigenous
peoples submit to the rule of Spain, demands made under the threat of violence if
the calls of the texts went unheeded (Faudree 2012, 183). In her analysis of the
Requerimiento, Faudree lays out four constituent parts of the structure of the texts
(Faudree 2012, 188):
1 Recounting of [Western] history, from creation through Papal donation
2 Explanation of Spanish authority to evangelize in the New World
3 Plea for the natives to submit to the Crown and permit evangelization
4 Promise of war if the natives do not submit
Faudree suggests that the participant framework of the texts is established most
clearly in the second half. Beginning in the third section, the text explicitly
requests the submission of native peoples to Spain. The fourth section, while
describing the consequences of resistance, also effectively constitutes the larger
social hierarchy that the texts establish (Faudree 2012, 188-89), a situation where
through their structure the texts both “describe and instantiate” a speciﬁc social
hierarchy (Faudree 2012, 188-89; Silverstein 1981, 9). Faudree argues that “the
entire narrative aims to create, through key speech acts, a speciﬁc conﬁguration of
socio-political relations by describing them. . .The text’s form is thus a key part of
the process by which Spanish authority is simultaneously indexically presupposed
and indexically created” (Faudree 2012, 189). A similar structure can be discerned
from the language used by the Israeli military in the Gaza texts presented below.
The texts highlight linguistic practices, which reify the vision of a militarily
powerful, but ultimately democratic, Israeli state alongside a Gaza that is
continually situated as disorderly and under the control of decidedly undemo-
cratic non-state actors.
Through communicative acts that establish an indeterminate and shifting
participant framework, the state draws Gazan civilians into a complex relationship
with its military. This relationship positions civilians as both metaphorical and
literal intermediaries in shadow conversations (Irvine 1996) taking place between
Palestinian ﬁghters and the state. These conversations take place outside of the
strict bounds of the texts, but coupled with the indeterminacies contained therein
constitute a larger body of discourse circulating between the military and
resistance organizations on the ground in Gaza. In doing so, SMS messages sent
to cellular phones eliminate the distance between civilians and abstract appara-
tuses of state-power, creating a form of intimacy wherein a direct line of
communication with the state is being carried around in the pocket of Gaza’s
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residents. Military leaﬂets falling over parts of Gaza during conﬂict, littering
already crowded streets, are manifestations of the conﬂict that engage Gazans on
multiple sensory levels: they can be picked up, read, used as fuel for ﬁres during
electricity shortages, or left to cover the ground until the conﬂict temporarily
recedes.
Along with this constructed sense of intimacy we can also view the distance
between the state and civilians as growing through the use of these linguistic
practices. By delivering these texts remotely, the military creates physical distance
between itself and civilians on the ground. This is coupled with the reality that
leaﬂets are delivered by the same machines that may later drop munitions on Gaza.
The duality of these machines in serving two contrastive purposes is in effect a
manifestation of the indeterminacy that falls out from the texts examined in this
study. As I highlight below, Israeli discursive engagement with Gazan civilians forms
a complex interplay of indeterminacies. The result of this interplay renders the state
illegible to civilians through ambiguous textual practices and the utilization of overly
general (and thus ineffective) information in the texts, but legible, democratic, and
humanitarian within the broader international community through the provision of
what is argued to be an effective warning. My analysis begins with a seven-word
SMS message sent by the Israeli military to a resident of Gaza during the 2012
conﬂict. Through the SMS we establish the initial layers of indeterminacy that are
then built upon by the subsequent analysis of a series of military leaﬂets used in
Gaza.
Touching the backbone: Gaza’s telecommunications infrastructure as a
military tool
During Operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012, Rana Baker, a freelance
journalist in Gaza, reported that her father received an SMS message from the Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF). Although to a Western audience, receiving an SMS message
from the military is unheard of, this is not unexpected in Gaza. By 2012, hacking of
Palestinian communications networks by Israeli military and intelligence ofﬁcers had
become an established practice. Similar methods were used during Operation Cast
lead in 2008-9, with as many as 250,000 calls being made to Gazan Palestinians, and
text messages sent to most cellular phones in Gaza by the military (Amnesty
International 2009; Tawil-Soury 2013, 80; Weizman 2009b).
The ability of Israeli intelligence ofﬁcials to tap into and make use of the Gazan
telecommunications infrastructure is one manifestation of what Tawil-Soury (2013)
terms the “digital occupation” and “high-tech enclosure” of the Gaza Strip. This type
of control is made possible through the architecture of Gaza’s communications
network that has Israel as its main technological support structure. Tawil-Soury
describes (2013, 58) that:
A telephone call made on a landline, even between Gaza City and Khan Younis, is physically
routed through Israel. Internet trafﬁc is routed through switches located outside the Gaza
Strip. Even on the ubiquitous cellular phones, calls must touch the Israeli backbone at some
point. Like much else about the Gaza Strip, telecommunication infrastructures are limited by
Israeli policies.
In spite of the commonality of the practice, visual data of the content of these SMS
messages is challenging to obtain. For clarity, the SMS message is presented below in
transcription and an English translation:2
Example 1: The next phase is coming, Operation Pillar of Defense (2012)3
al-marḥala al-muqabala qa:dima ibta‛adu: ‛an ‛ana:ṣir ḥama:s
“The next phase is coming, distance yourselves from Hamas elements.”
4 Journal of Linguistic Anthropology
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The SMS message was written in Standard Arabic, a code choice recurrent
throughout all of the texts examined in this analysis. Standard Arabic, although
spoken natively by none of Arabic’s 300 million speakers, is the default written form
of Arabic. It is the language of literature, news, and ofﬁcial forms of government
communication (see Holes 2004). In addition to the prominent place of Standard
Arabic in institutional frameworks, the dialects of Arabic are also rarely codiﬁed in
writing.4 This makes Standard Arabic the default code for these texts, which can be
viewed as part of a larger body of “ofﬁcial” government discourse.5
Although Standard Arabic is a default for written Arabic, use of this variety
presupposes that the recipient is able to comprehend the message. Despite strong
Palestinian education rates, with literacy rates rising rapidly in more recent years,
cycles of violence and economic disparity over the past three decades have
resulted in the gradual collapse of educational infrastructure in the Gaza Strip
(Roy 2007, 228 & 292). Children, the elderly, and women in Gaza show the
highest degrees of illiteracy, which could, if they encounter these texts, require
that they turn to their social networks in order to determine the meaning of the
message, thus complicating their own ability to react quickly to the warnings that
the texts contain.6
Both local media outlets covering the use of these methods and my own experience
in Gaza speaking with civilians suggests that one primary issue with these messages
is that civilians largely do not feel as if they can trust the information they contain.
Despite the state’s attestation that they provide regular and effective warnings to
civilians of impending military action, a legacy of seemingly never-ending conﬂict
creates an environment where there is little trust in the motives of the state. Civilians
also suggest that another factor that renders these messages largely illegible is that
the strikes that we will see mentioned in the remaining texts below often never
materialize. In addition, many of the warnings distributed by the military in Gaza are
sent across most of the territory, which Amnesty International (2009, 51) has argued
renders them too general to constitute an effective warning. The result is what
residents describe as a form of psychological warfare, where knowing what
information is accurate, what (or who) may be targeted, or when operations may
take place is never certain. Similar to what Das (2004, 227) has described with respect
to the Indian state, in Gaza this ultimately reﬂects an instability between what the
texts contain and the potential for the texts to manifest as military action.
Drawing on Faudree’s (2012, 190-91) discussion on the referential indeterminacy of
the Requerimiento, the fact that these SMS messages may not be understood or are too
general to be useful, reﬂects that they may not have been the targets of the message.
Looking outside of the immediate environment of Gaza, the content these messages
suggests that the broader regional or international community may have been the
ultimate recipients of the texts. This indeterminacy reﬂects how “language can be
used by those who have (or wish to claim) power to prescribe while purporting to
describe; to ﬁx and deﬁne others while retaining all of the advantages of
indeterminacy and all the maneuver room of processes of situational adjustment”
(Jaffe 2009, 246). In this sense, the interplay between the illegibility of the texts to
those on the ground and their simultaneous legibility in the international community
provides the Israeli military with room to maneuver in wider international debates
surrounding their actions during war. The use of Arabic here, regardless of whether
or not it is understood, provides the military with the ability to say that it provided
warnings to Gazan residents in their primary language of communication, an option
that would not be available had the messages been sent in Hebrew or English, two
other major languages of communication used in Israel.
In turn, the provision of a warning and the citability of these texts (Das 2004, 234)
as they circulate in the international community supports Israeli state claims to the
legitimacy of their actions in the conﬂict. The effectiveness of this tactic can be seen in
the frequency with which the news organizations covering the use of this tactic
highlight the nature of the texts as a warning to civilians. The only exceptions to this
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framing of the data as a warning designed to help civilians came from reports
published by Maan, a major local Palestinian news agency, and +972 magazine, an
online magazine dedicated to opposing the Israeli occupation.
Moving beyond the issue of linguistic code and legibility, by looking more broadly
at the events of Occupation Pillar of Defense we can reconstruct the temporal
development of the conﬂict in relation to the SMS message. The ‘prior phase’ that the
message alludes to began with an air strike that killed Ahmed Jabari, the head of
Hamas’ military wing in Gaza on November 14th, 2012.7 The SMS provides a
warning of impending military action for the recipient. However, the time frame for
“the next stage” remains ambiguous. This temporal indeterminacy makes it possible,
as Jaffe (2009) notes, “to suggest without the risks of assertion; and with the beneﬁts
of after-the-fact denials or reconstruals of their meanings and stances” (243).
Alongside this temporal indeterminacy, the use of the term ‘ana:sir ‘elements’ adds a
layer of lexical indeterminacy to the text by leaving the referent of an ‘element’
undeﬁned, a point that will be investigated in more detail later in this analysis.
Alongside the overwhelming military power of the state, through the system of
blockade that has been in place in Gaza since 20078 , the state has secured almost total
control of the movement of aid, goods, and people in and out of the coastal territory.
Through these discursive practices the state is able to provide warning to Gazan
residents—an action that would be expected of a democratic actor engaged in armed
conﬂict, while still maintaining control over both the territory and the temporal
development of the conﬂict. This ability to control virtually all aspects of day-to-day
life in Gaza, Halper’s (2000) “matrix of control”, also constitutes a larger strategic
advantage for the military. The use of language in the texts examined here serves to
further reinforce their position of power in the conﬂict, and their ability to control the
development of the conﬂict by controlling the ﬂow and form of information.
Interestingly, the participant framework created through this indeterminacy is
ultimately as indeterminate as the SMS itself. On one level, the fact that this practice is
commonplace and was used en masse across Gaza bleaches the message of any
personal elements. On another level, Gazans are receiving SMS messages from the
Israeli military, an extension of the state. This ability to carry out such an intensely
personal act reﬂects the degree of power and control that the state has over Gaza’s
residents, a visual manifestation of the methods of digital control discussed
previously (Tawil-Soury 2013).
This form of constructed intimacy is also one in which neither the recipient nor the
addressee is clear. It is impossible to know who authored the message or their role in
the conﬂict, but although the author is unidentiﬁed, the relationship itself is not
completely indeterminate. The message that Baker’s father received was likely part of
a larger blast of SMS messages sent to many of the cellular phones in the Gaza Strip.
Still, the military has the ability to target speciﬁc phones and individuals in particular
areas of Gaza, as evidenced by the practice of calling civilians to alert them that their
speciﬁc home has been marked for air strikes.9 The result is a practice that is, on one
hand, delivered through both extremely personal and intimate methods—reaching
civilians on their personal cellular phones—and impersonally, through language that
reads as somber, devoid of emotion, and detached. The military’s ability to reach
individuals directly closes the gap between what are often abstract state power
structures and the daily, lived experiences of those on the ground. What these texts
and the methods by which they are delivered represents is the potential for the
military to reach across boundaries that demarcate the traditional structure of the
state (Poole 2004, 50). Ultimately, as these texts show, the distinction between the
state’s margin and its center is continually blurred, renegotiated, transgressed, and
reconﬁgured (Poole 2004, 55).
Through the language of these texts and the forms of warning they contain, the
Israeli military is able to position itself as democratic, moral, and just in the way it
manages conﬂicts. Military strategy here works hand in hand with the indeterminacy
of the participant framework of the conﬂict and the mapping of multiple different
6 Journal of Linguistic Anthropology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
participant roles onto a given actor (Irvine 1996). Beyond this issue of positioning, the
use of these texts also, in Das’ terms, creates a situation in which Gazans are “pulled
into the gravitational force of the state through the circulation of documents
produced by its functionaries” (2004, 229). Within the Gaza context, the ultimate
effect of this pull towards the center is that it nulliﬁes claims by civilians of potential
criminality of the state during times of conﬂict. To circulate a warning, even if it does
not constitute an effective advanced warning within humanitarian frameworks
(Amnesty International 2009) then “becomes proof of the ‘legality’ of the operations.”
(Das 2004, 240).
Moving to an examination of leaﬂets used in Gaza between 2008-2014, we can
see that the military again takes on multiple roles, acting both with concern for
civilians through the provision of a warning, but also with calculated language
that serves larger state aims. However, by adding leaﬂets to this emerging
picture of state communication in Gaza it becomes clear that through layered
indeterminacies and the shifts in participant roles that result, civilians oscillate
between belligerent and non-combatant, positioning them as intermediaries
between resistance ﬁghters and the state. One particular form of indeterminacy
that facilitates these subtle shifts in the participant framework is the use of lexical
indeterminacy tied to the notion of ‘terrorist elements’ within Gaza that are the
stated targets of Israeli strikes.
‘an"aṣir: The replication of lexical indeterminacy across texts
One consistent thread through the data presented in this analysis is the use of the lexical
item ‘ana:ṣir - ‘elements’. However, what constitutes an element in these texts is rarely
deﬁned. Although it is reasonable to suspect that the IDF uses ‘ana:ṣir to reference
Hamas militants or installations, in a densely populated area like Gaza, what
constitutes an ‘element’ is often not entirely clear. The choice of targets by the Israeli
military in the past three conﬂicts also reﬂects that ‘ana:ṣirmay refer to obviousmilitary
targets such as rocket launching sites and resistance tunnels or training camps, but also
seemingly innocuous sites such as homes, schools, hospitals, or United Nations
facilities. As a result, the indeterminacy emerging from the use of ‘ana:ṣir makes it
challenging for civilians who receive these messages to follow their instructions.
As I have argued in relation to the SMS message discussed above, the
indeterminacy of ‘ana:ṣir provides moral or legal room for the military to conduct
itself in conﬂict, while also reifying a speciﬁc image of the state within the
international community. Continually framed as a warning to civilians, these texts
form part of what is regularly described as a form of ‘humanitarian war’ being
conducted in the Gaza Strip (Asad 2007; Weizman 2009b, 557; 2011). The use of
language here couples with the use of forms of high technology, notably the ability to
reach speciﬁc individuals on cellular phones, targeted assassination techniques that
are said to reduce civilian casualties, and the increasingly ubiquitous tactic of
‘knocking on the roof’10 during times of open conﬂict. As it is, couched within the
broader discursive context of a warning, ‘ana:ṣir puts in writing that targets exist, and
that this has been communicated to civilians so that they can avoid them.
However, to civilians the continually shifting and seemingly arbitrary nature ofwhat
constitutes a ‘terrorist element’ renders the state largely illegible. This illegibility stems
from the overly general nature of many of the warnings provided by the IDF in Gaza.
Even in cases like those presented below where speciﬁc directions are given, human
rights organizations have argued that these texts do not constitute effective advanced
warnings within current international humanitarian frameworks (Amnesty Interna-
tional 2009) and make it challenging, if not impossible, for civilians to effectively judge
the safest course of action. Still, the use of these forms of indeterminacy and, crucially,
that they occur within a textual warning does not serve to challenge the idea of a
democratic and humanitarian state carrying out conﬂict against a disordered,
uncivilized, non-state actor at its margins (Das and Poole 2004, 6).
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This type of lexical indeterminacy and what it accomplishes can be grounded in
another conﬂict: the United States drone warfare campaign (Benjamin 2013; Kaag
and Kreps 2014). In the language of drone warfare, we see another example of
how linguistic indeterminacy is used to the beneﬁt of the state, reinforcing
hierarchies of power while framing state military actions in broader humanitarian
terms. A level of indeterminacy parallel to that of ‘ana:ṣir is evident in what the
United States military and Central Intelligence Agency have termed ‘signature’
drone strikes. These drone strikes are carried out on individuals, groups, or
structures that carry the ‘signature’ of terrorist activity. However, the political and
military actors involved in US drone operations have been reluctant to commit to
a description of what constitutes the ‘signature’ of terror activity. The resultant
indeterminacy keeps the referential meaning of the term opaque, allowing the
military and CIA to more easily conduct themselves without having to fully
deﬁne the scope of their operations.
These forms of indeterminacy and their efﬁcacy reﬂect the extent of state power
and control in situations of conﬂict. Through its superior military power, the United
States is able to conduct the “War on Terror” (Hodges 2011) while leaving
indeterminate the targets of war. In the Gazan context, through a complex web of
indeterminacies the military is able to carry out strikes against militant groups while
often not deﬁning what the ‘elements’ are that civilians should avoid. To further
exemplify this point, I turn now to a collection of military leaﬂets used in Gaza. These
leaﬂets highlight that the indeterminacies in the SMS message analyzed not only
provide the military with ﬂexibility in conducting its operations, but also continually
reposition civilians in differing relations to the military and to resistance groups
operating in the Gaza Strip.
Lend a helping hand to your brothers and sisters in the Strip: military
leaﬂets in Gaza
Compared to the sparse visual availability of SMS messages sent by the IDF to Gazan
Palestinians, military leaﬂets constitute a larger body of data. The practice of
dropping leaﬂets on both civilian and military areas during wartime is not new.
Beginning on a large scale during World War I, leaﬂets have become a fairly well
established method of alerting residents of an area of impending military actions, as
well as playing a role in psychological warfare against enemy combatants (Taylor
2003, 188-90).
For this analysis I have selected four examples of military leaﬂets, all of which
were collected from various international news reports about the use of this tactic by
the Israeli military, as well as from the ofﬁcial IDF blog, which has regularly
published information about the steps taken by the military to reduce civilian
casualties in Gaza.11 The news sources were all major local and international news
agencies,12 13 14 and these speciﬁc examples were chosen because they best highlight
the range of indeterminacies present within the discourse of military leaﬂets in Gaza.
The data below is presented in two columns, with transcription on the left and a
translation of the Arabic into English on the right.
Example 2: Take responsibility for your fate, Operation Cast Lead (2009)15
1. baya:n ha:mm li-sukka:n al-qiṭa:‛ Important statement for the residents of the
2. Strip
3. nmin ajli sala:matikum, taḥlu: al-mus’u:liyya For your safety, take responsibility for your
4. ‛an maṣi:rkum wa tajannabu: al-iqtira:b min fate and avoid approaching Hamas elements
5. ‛ana:ṣir ḥama:s wa mara:kiziha: allati sawfa and centers which will put your lives at risk.
6. tu‛arriḍu ḥaya:takum li-l-xaṭar. ḥama:s wa Hamas has once again led the area to military
7. marra uxra: taqu:d al-minṭaqa ’ila: taṣ‛i:d escalation and bloodshed and the Israeli
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8. ‛askari: wa ’ila saﬁk lil-dima:’ ’inna jay!s Defense Force is determined to protect the
9. al-difa:‛ al-’isra:’i:liyy ‛a:zim ‛ala ḥima:yat citizens of the State of Israel as necessary.
10. sukka:n dawlat ’isra:’i:l kullama: taṭallaba
11. al-amr.
12. ’inna haḏa al-baya:n sa:ri: al-maf‛u:l li- This statement is valid until the return of
13. ḥi:n‛awdat al-hudu’ ’ila al-minṭaqa. calm to the region.
14.
15. qiya:dat jay!s al-difa:‛ al-’isra:’i:liyy Israeli Defense Forces Headquarters
Parallel to the structure introduced by Faudree (2012, 188), when examining these
leaﬂets as part of a larger collective body of Israeli military discourse, I suggest a
recurrent structure for these texts containing four constituent parts:
1 Position Palestinian resistance ﬁghters as the recurrent source of regional
tension
2 Project the right of the military to protect its citizens
3 Establish the onus of responsibility for safety as a primarily civilian concern
4 Promise of violence if military warnings go unheeded
In the example above the opaque term ‛ana:ṣir ‘elements’ (line 4) surfaces again, with
the same level of indeterminacy as in the SMS message sent to Baker’s father.
Following this initial form of indeterminacy, by establishing the ﬁrst part of the
framework through positioning Palestinian ﬁghters as the source of tension (lines 5-7)
the military is able to solidify and maintain the second part of the structure, the right
of the military to protect Israeli civilians (lines 7-9).
The third part of this textual architecture (lines 3-5) plays a major role in
shifting the participant framework of the conﬂict by placing the responsibility for
safety on civilians themselves, while insinuating a relationship between civilians
and the resistance ﬁghters that Israel has engaged in combat. Finally, the fourth
part of this framework provides a warning (lines 8-9) to recipients of the message
that violence will continue if the messages in the texts are ignored. Beyond
establishing the fourth part of the textual structure, the military notes (lines 12-13)
that their promise of violence is valid until calm returns to the area, but what
constitutes calm and who makes that decision, remains ambiguous. We can only
assume, given their position of power, that the military views themselves as the
arbiters in determining when the present round of conﬂict will abate. While the
order in which the structure is established varies, with multiple constituent parts
at times being established by similar passages in the texts, the use and
development of this framework allows the military to inject layers of indetermi-
nacy into the conﬂict, both in its participant framework and into the texts
themselves.
As was the case with the SMS message sent to Baker’s father, the participant
framework of this leaﬂet is ambiguous. The leaﬂet is addressed to the residents of the
Gaza Strip, but it is unclear from the language of the message whether they are
viewed as participants in or victims of the conﬂict. Superﬁcially, this leaﬂet projects
the residents as victims of the ﬁghting that Hamas has brought upon the Gaza Strip.
However, the indeterminacy that abounds regarding what the military considers a
legitimate target in Gaza simultaneously positions the residents of the Strip in a
liminal space somewhere between victim and participant. The leaﬂet instructs the
residents of Gaza to negotiate their positionality within this indeterminate frame-
work, making a choice regarding what to do after receiving the leaﬂet.16 In engaging
with the leaﬂet and subsequently making that choice, civilians are further drawn into
the participant framework of the conﬂict, or in Das’ (2004, 229) terms the
“gravitational force” of the state and through the sheer existence, use, and
circulation of the leaﬂet, military action is licensed (Faudree 2012, 190; Spitulnik
1997).
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These military leaﬂets and the method by which they are delivered to Gazans also
parallels the power dynamic of the conﬂict, a point mentioned at the outset of this
analysis. The leaﬂets are typically distributed by drones or ﬁghter jets: the same
machines that may later drop explosives in Gaza are used to drop warnings for its
residents. The use of the same machines to carry out seemingly contradictory aims
reﬂects yet another layer of the indeterminacy present in the Gazan context. By
examining another example, also from Operation Cast Lead in 2008-9, we see how
even though certain forms of indeterminacy may recede, the overall indeterminate
participant framework is maintained through a process of layering new forms of
indeterminacy into the text and onto its recipients:
Example 3: Lend a helping hand, Operation Cast Lead (2009)17 18
1. ’ila sukka:n qiṭa:‛ _gazza To the residents of the Gaza Strip
2. taḥammalu al-mas’u:liyya ‛an maṣi:rikum! Take responsibility for your fate!
3. ’inna muṭliqi: al-ṣaw:ari:x wa al-‛ana:ṣir Rocket launchers and terrorist elements pose
4. al-’irha:biyya yu!sakkilu:n xaṭar-an a threat to you and your families.
5. ‛alaykum‛ala ‛a:’ila:tikum.
6.
7. ’iḏa kuntum ta _gribu:n ﬁ: taqdi:m ’ayd If you want to lend a helping hand and assist
8. al-‛awn wa al-musa:‛ada li-’aha:li:kum wa your brothers and sisters in the Strip, then
9. ’ixwa:nikum ﬁ: al-qiṭa:‛ ma: ‛alaykum ’illa: contact the number below to let us know the
10. al-ittiṣa:l ‛ala al-raqam ’adna:h l- location of rocket launchers and terrorist
11. iṭṭila:‛ina ‛ala mawa:qi‛ minaṣṣa:t gangs that made you hostage to their
12. al-ṣawa:ri:x wa al-‛iṣa:ba:t al-’irha:biyya operations.
13. allati ja‛alat minkum rahi:na li-
14. ‛amali:ya:tiha:.
15.
16. mana‛a waqawa‛a al-fa:ja‛a aṣbaḥ bayna Preventing the tragedy from happening is in
17. ’aydi:kum. your hands.
18.
19. la: tataraddadu:! Do not hesitate!
20. sa-nuraḥḥib bi-jami:‛ al-ma‛lu:ma:t We will welcome all available information -
21. bidu:n al-ḥa:ja ’ila 21. ḏikr tafa:ṣi:likum without the need to mention your personal
22. al-!saxṣi:yya. details
23. al-sirri:yya maḍmu:na. Conﬁdentiality assured.
24. yumkinukum al-ittiṣa:l bina:‛abra al- You can contact the following number:
25. raqam al-ta:li: 02-5839749 02-5839749
26.’aw ‛ala: al-‛unwa:n al-ta:li: And the following email address:
27. helpgaza2008@gmail.com helpgaza2008@gmail.com
28. li-taqdi:m ’ayy ma‛lu:ma ladaykum ‛an To provide any information you have about
29. na!sa:ṭ al-‛ana:ṣir al-’irha:biyya the activity of terrorist elements.
30.
31. qiya:dat jay!s al-difa:‛ al-’isra:’i:liyy Israeli Defense Force Headquarters
As with the leaﬂet in example 2, we can see the constituent parts of the structure
that I have outlined above being established anew in example 3. The ﬁrst constituent
part of the structure, positioning Palestinian ﬁghters as a source of regional tension is
implicitly established (lines 3-4) through language that describes them as a threat. In
doing so, the right of the military to respond, the second part of the structure, is also
established. The third part of the structure is solidiﬁed (lines 2 and 16) through
describing responsibility as being in the hands of civilians and imploring them to
avoid bloodshed. This mention of bloodshed (line 16) also establishes an implicit
promise of violence if this message is ignored, completing the remaining component
of the overarching structure of these texts. Although ‛ana:ṣir ‘elements’ is used again
in this example, rocket launchers are also mentioned (lines 3 and 10), providing a
slightly more concrete notion of what constitutes a terrorist element to the IDF.
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This leaﬂet also actively solicits collaboration (line 10) from Gazan civilians to
assist in Israel’s military campaign, a crime that, in Gaza, is punishable by death.19
This leaﬂet is a departure from the other texts examined thus far, in that the
participant framework has shifted slightly. While earlier examples positioned Gazan
residents in an indeterminate or liminal position in relation to both the IDF and
Hamas ﬁghters, that is not the case in example 3. Here, the text positions the residents
of Gaza closer to victims. Crucially, however, they are not victims of Israeli strikes,
but victims of “terrorist gangs” (lines 10-11) operating in Gaza that the military
would like civilians to help them eradicate. In drawing civilians into the scope of the
state (Das 2004) by soliciting collaboration, the state contrasts civilians with terror
elements in Gaza, reifying the notion of a ‘margin’ that “represents a zone of
instability and danger precisely because it lies outside both the control and territory
of the national state” (Poole 2004, 54).
The promise of anonymity (lines 20-22) from the IDF, which can be seen as
welcoming the development of a relationship based on trust, is also made
indeterminate when viewed in light of the relative ease with which Israeli intelligence
ofﬁcials have been able to tap into the Gazan telecommunications infrastructure
(Tawil-Soury 2013; Weizman 2009b). Additionally, the use of email introduces
electronic indeterminacy into the relationship between the recipients of this leaﬂet
and the military. Through email the military opens a direct line of communication
with civilians, establishing the potential for a personal connection between two
disparate groups.
However, the connection suggested by the leaﬂet keeps the identities of Israeli
ofﬁcials receiving the messages hidden, while further undermining their offer of
anonymity through the military’s access to a personal detail that the leaﬂet describes
as not required, an email (or Internet Protocol) address. In a sense this is yet another
manifestation of the power imbalance in the conﬂict, this time through double-
voicing (Bakhtin 1981, 324) which here protects Israeli ofﬁcials while opening up a
space whereby potential collaborators are vulnerable. In this leaﬂet, the military can
offer conﬁdentiality and anonymity to those Gazans willing to collaborate, but
collaboration implies necessarily giving up your anonymity by providing contact
information, which can then be tracked by the military. This is reiﬁed further by the
frequency with which would-be one-time collaborators are pursued by intelligence
offers to extract additional information regarding militant activities in Gaza.20 The
two remaining leaﬂets, both from Operation Protective Edge in July-August 2014,
add new layers of indeterminacy to the participant structure by positioning civilians
as simultaneously complicit in, and victims of the most recent round of violence.
Example 4: The battle is ongoing, Operation Protective Edge (2014)21
1. ’ila: sukka:n al-qiṭa:‛ To the population of the Strip
2. ‛alaykum naql ha:ḏihi al-risa:la ’ila Transfer this message to your leaders hiding
3. qa:datikum al-muxtabi’i:n taḥt al-’arḍ underground:
4. al-ma‛raka maftu:ḥa The battle is ongoing
5.
6. kull ’afra:d qa:dat ḥama:s wa ba:qi: All members of the Hamas leadership and
7. al-ḥaraka:t al’-irha:biyya _gayr ’a:mini:n the leaderships of other terrorist movements
8. are not safe
9. jay!s al-difa:‛ al-’isra:’i:liyy The Israel Defense Forces
Unlike earlier examples, which showed more overt linguistic manifestations of the
constituent structure developed for these texts, the participant structure in example 4
is implied rather than explicit. From this example we see that the IDF views Hamas
and other resistance organizations in Gaza as aggressors in the conﬂict. By noting
(lines 4 and 7) that the battle is ongoing and that militants are not safe we discern that
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the IDF is actively engaged in what it views as a struggle to protect its own citizens.
In describing (line 2-3) that this message, aimed at groups “hiding underground”, is
being transferred to the residents of Gaza the military successfully places respon-
sibility on civilians for how the conﬂict unfolds. Finally, in concert with establishing
the second part of the constituent structure, noting that the battle is ongoing (line 4)
also implies that additional violence is forthcoming.
Through the manner in which the military places responsibility on civilians in
example 4 and the speciﬁc mention that their leaders are in hiding underground, this
example reﬂects a particular facet of the 2014 conﬂict that is perhaps more speciﬁc
than earlier leaﬂets. During Operation Protective Edge, Palestinian militants made
use of an expansive network of underground tunnels stretching from Gaza into
Israel. This allowed Palestinian ﬁghters to not only seek refuge from the ﬁghting but
also strike military and civilian targets inside of Israel.22 In light of this context, the
mention of “hiding underground” could suggest that these tunnel-based military
tactics are what the IDF is referring to, providing a substantially more concrete
context for the message. However, another reading of these lines is possible. By
describing them as hiding underground in a leaﬂet delivered to civilians, the message
undermines Hamas’ leadership abilities, portraying them as cowardly in the face of
conﬂict. The reminder (line 4) that the conﬂict continues above ground is perhaps less
of a reminder to Hamas and is aimed more directly at civilians, an attempt to suggest
that their leadership has abandoned them. This example also echoes larger military
discourses that characterize Hamas ﬁghters as using their own citizens as shields in
the ﬁghting.23 It is unclear, however, if employing this type of discourse in a military
leaﬂet successfully undermined Hamas’ position in Gaza.
As the language discussed above suggests, this leaﬂet takes a decidedly different,
and more aggressive tone towards the residents of the Gaza Strip than earlier
examples. While the leaﬂet undermines Hamas’ leadership ability, it also positions
civilians as an intermediary between the military and Palestinian ﬁghters by stating,
“Transfer this message to your leaders hiding underground” (lines 2-3). The concern
by the military evidenced through the language of the earlier leaﬂets is completely
absent here, with the language of this message essentially implicating civilians in the
wider conﬂict by placing them linguistically in the middle of a ﬁght between a state
military and a resistance organization.
The possible, varied readings for this leaﬂet simultaneously works against Hamas
leadership while placing civilians in an uncertain position. The participant frame-
work of the conﬂict shifts again in example 4 through language that positions
civilians as complicit in the ﬁghting. The remaining example is the least indetermi-
nate and most legible of the data presented, but the overall structure and framing of
these messages, which layers indeterminacies to strategically position both the
military and civilians, remains apparent.
Example 5: You are hereby forewarned to exercise caution, Operation Protective
Edge (2014)24
1. bala: _g ‛askariyy ’ila sukka:n bayt la:hi:ya Military Announcement to the population of
2. Beit Lahia
3. bi-l-ra _gm min muba:darat waqf ’iṭla:q al- Despite the ceaseﬁre initiative, Hamas and
4. na:r ‛ala: ḥama:s wa al-ḥaraka:t al- other terrorist movements continue to ﬁre
5. ’irha:biyya al-’uxra: istamirru: ﬁ: iṭla:qihim [on Israel].
6. al-na:r li-ha:ḏa: Therfore:
7.
8. sa-yaqu:mu jay!s al-difa:‛ al-’isra:’i:liyy bil- The Israeli Defense Forces will work with
9. ‛amal bi-quwwa wa ‛azam li-l-ḍarb min al- strength and vigor to strike from the air
10. jaww al-‛ana:ṣir al-’irha:bi:yya wa al- terrorist elements and infrastructure in areas
11. buna: al-taḥti:yya al-ta:bi‛a la-ha: ﬁ: al- from which rockets are ﬁred towards the
12. mana:ṭiq allati tuṭlaqu min-ha al-ṣawa:ri:x State of Israel and they are as follows:
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13. bi-ittija:h dawlat ’isra:’i:l hiya ka-l-ta:li:
14.
15. min !sarq ‛aṭa:ṭara wa ḥatta: !sa:ri‛ From East of ‘aṭa:ṭara to Sultans Street and
16. al-sala:ṭi:n wa min _garb wa !sima:l from the West and North of Jabalia Camp.
17. mu‛askar jaba:li:yya
18.
19. min ’ajl salama:tikum: For your safety:
20. ‛alaykum ’ixla:’ buyu:tikum ḥa:lan wa Evacuate your homes immediately and go to
21. fawran wa al-ittija:h ila janu:b jaba:li:yya the South of Jabalia city via the following
22. al-balad ‛ibra al-ṭari:q al-ta:li: way:
23.
24. !sa:ri‛ al-fa:lu:ja wa ha:ḏa: ḥatta: al-sa:‛a Fallujah Street as of 12pm on Sunday July
25. 12 ðˤuhur yawm al-’aḥad 13.7.2014 13th, 2014.
26.
27. jay!s al-difa:‛ al-’isra:’i:liyy _gayr ma‛niyy The Israeli Defense Forces is not interested
28. bi-l-lams bikum wa bi-’abna:’ ‛ale:kum in coming in contact with you and your
29. ha:ḏihi al-‛amaliyya:t maw’aqata wa families. These operations are [temporary
30. qaṣi:ra kul man sa-yaxa:lif ha:ḏihi a- and short]. All who counter these
31. ta‛li:ma:t wa la: yaxli: instructions and don’t leave immediately are
32. baytahu ‛ala: al-fawr ḥaya:tuhu wa ḥaya:t putting their lives and the lives of their
33. ’abna:’ ‛a:’ilatihi lil-xaṭar!!!! families in danger!!!!
34.
35. a‛ḏara man ’anḏara! You are hereby forewarned to exercise
36. caution!
37.
38. qiya:dat jay!s al-difa:‛ al-’isra:’i:liyy Israeli Defense Forces Headquarters
In example 5 (lines 3-4), Palestinian resistance groups are again positioned as a
source of tension, here through what the military describes as the violation of a
ceaseﬁre. This violation results (lines 8-12) in the military responding to rocket ﬁre
directed at Israel and its citizens. Responsibility for the safety of Gazan residents is
placed again in the hands of civilians (lines 30-36), through language that suggests
that those who do not immediately follow the leaﬂet’s instruction are in mortal
danger. Finally, by noting (lines 27-29) that the military does not want to come into
contact with civilians, an implicit promise of further violence is established.
Further, the lexical indeterminacy of ‛ana:ṣir ‛elements’ surfaces for a ﬁnal time in
this example. Despite the indeterminacy of ‛ana:ṣir that has run as thread throughout
many of these texts, this example actually provides the greatest degree of useable
information for civilians regarding military operations. The leaﬂet (lines 15-16)
speciﬁes the areas of Beit Lahia, north of Gaza City, that have been targeted for
strikes, providing street names and directions (lines 20-25) to the recipients of the
leaﬂets as to where they should go to avoid potential airstrikes. This is a departure
from the often ambiguous mentions of military strikes in the earlier examples.
In this leaﬂet the military again appears to occupy a position of concern for the
safety of civilians within the participant framework of the conﬂict, a theme common
in some of the examples analyzed above. This concern, although highly visible in this
example, still does not displace one of the major forms of indeterminacy that has been
covered in my analysis of these texts. Civilians in Beit Lahia, regardless of their actual
relationship with Palestinian resistance groups, are again located as an intermediary
between the military and these organizations through the structure of the text.
Although they are not the expressed recipient of the message, in these forms of
communication resistance organizations are made ratiﬁed overhearers (Goffman
1981) in the sense that, once these messages are dropped in Gaza, they can be read by
anyone who picks them up. However, by labeling civilians as the “ofﬁcial” recipients
(Goffman 1981) of the message, the military again is able to position them as an
intermediary between the IDF and Hamas. As I have argued above, through
positioning the civilian recipients (Goffman 1981) of these messages as intermediaries
Gaza at the margins? 13
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
in the wider shadow conversation taking place between the IDF and resistance
groups regarding blame for the conﬂict, the military is able to continually and
repeatedly shift the participant framework (Irvine 1996, 140).
Through the shifting and multiple layers of indeterminacy that have surfaced in
this analysis, civilians remain in a space somewhere between non-combatant and
participant, between the violence of the margins and the order and scope of the state.
On the surface this ﬁnal example removes the more ﬂatly visible manifestations of
indeterminacy that have been highlighted throughout the study. However, the ﬁnal
leaﬂet still fulﬁlls all of the constituent parts of textual architecture laid out above. In
doing so, this message highlights that in its essence this is an architecture built on,
maintained, and proliferated through indeterminacy. Through this indeterminacy,
language reinforces and supports the larger social hierarchies and power structures
of what has become the world’s most enduring protracted conﬂict.
Conclusion: Prevent the tragedy from being on your hands
Tawil-Soury and Matar (2016, 2-4) describe that throughout its history many
metaphors and narratives have been ascribed to Gaza. Perhaps most vivid among
these have been the presentation of Gaza as an open air prison, a metaphor which
lays bare the refusal of the world to truly work toward solving the Israel-Palestine
conﬂict. Gaza also offers a possible window into “Israel’s contemporary weakness –
whether a weakness of its military to dispose of Gaza, or a weakness of morality in
attempting to do just that” (Tawil-Soury and Matar 2016, 2). As they describe, Gaza
“has always been and remains a problem for Israel” (Tawil-Soury and Matar 2016, 7).
The coastal enclave has refused to be silenced, despite numerous attempts to relegate
it permanently to the margins.
If Gaza refuses to be silenced, then, how should it be located when it is viewed
alongside the enduring social and political project of maintaining the sovereignty of
the Israeli state? Is it merely a violent thorn in Israel’s side? Or perhaps it, and its
present political leaders, are the primary barrier to both the security of Israel and the
viability of a future Palestinian state? Variations on these themes certainly constitute
much of the discourse that circulates about Gaza. However, I conclude by reiterating
what I feel are perhaps the more salient characteristics of the data that I have
presented. Indeterminacy has served as a thread that unites these varied texts. The
SMS messages and leaﬂets presented here create a chain of communication between
the military and Gazans, but this communication only travels from the upper levels
of abstracted state power down to the daily lived reality of Gaza’s residents. On the
streets of Gaza where these texts are experienced, indeterminacy renders the state
illegible (Das 2004, 244) through a complex process of shifting participant roles that
puts civilians on perpetually uncertain footing.
The deployment of language in these forms and via the methods analyzed
throughout this study creates spaces both locally and internationally where the state
actively negotiates its relationship with its margins. Poole has argued that this
relationship between the state “and its violent, extrajudicial, primitive, or natural
‘margins’ is simultaneously both accepted and denied as a more or less constant and
central feature of the judiciary, and indeed of ‘the state’ in general” (2004, 51). I push
Poole’s statement further, arguing that Gaza is indispensable to Israel and cannot
ever truly be relegated to its margins. A modern Israel cannot deﬁne itself without
Gaza, despite mainstream political discourse’s attempts to situate it forever outside of
the scope of the state and antithetical to democracy. Gaza has and continues to
reinstate its centrality, as Tawil-Soury and Matar (2016) have described. However,
this centrality transcends the levels of culture, history, or even the nature of
international political regimes. Within its context, Gaza is essential to the emergence
and maintenance of the state itself.
The state has utilized Gaza as a tool in the ongoing project of reifying its own
status as a legible, locatable, sovereign democracy within the international
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community. Achille Mbembe has argued that “to exercise control over morality and
to deﬁne life as the deployment and manifestation of power” (2003, 12) is an essential
component of the maintenance of sovereignty. An analysis of language in this context
highlights one means by which the state asserts that control. Das has described that
“the iterability of writing, the citability of its utterances” (2004, 234) makes possible
conditions under which new social practices come into being that allow the state to
reproduce itself. The language present in the leaﬂets and SMS messages deployed in
Gaza forms one component of a constellation of methods that are used by the state
for this purpose. In doing so, these texts highlight not simply the power of the state to
produce “killable bodies” (Agamben 1998; Das and Poole 2004, 13), rendering them
as bare life, suggesting instead that Gaza represents not a state of exception, a
margin, but that it is embedded in every sense in the life of the state (Das and Poole
2004, 13).
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al-Ammari for their comments on various drafts. Over the course of revision, the manuscript
also beneﬁted greatly from further suggestions from Micah Hughes, Nancy Hawker, the
editors, and the two anonymous reviewers. Finally, I would like to thank the individuals who I
had the opportunity to speak with during my time in Gaza. Any remaining errors are, of
course, my own.
2. Transcription was carried out based on the Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and
Linguistics (Versteegh et al 2006) transcription protocol.
3. The content of the SMS can be retrieved from: http://972mag.com/idf-sends-text-messa
ge-to-gaza-mobile-phones-the-next-phase-is-on-the-way/60046/ (accessed 21 January 2017)
4. With the advent of technology and in particular social media, this is actually changing.
Still, ofﬁcial military communication remains a domain for Standard Arabic.
5. In a sense these texts fall into the larger collective of Arabic language materials published
by the Israeli state, given that Arabic is one of the ofﬁcial languages of the state of Israel, even
though Gaza’s residents are not Israeli citizens.
6. A 2015 report by the United Nations Development Program shows that in general,
literacy rates among Palestinians, and speciﬁcally in Gaza are high. However vulnerable
groups, namely the elderly, children, and women show the highest illiteracy rates across the
Palestinian community. http://www.ps.undp.org/content/dam/papp/docs/Publications/
UNDP-papp-research-PHDR2015Education.pdf (accessed 21 January 2017).
7. The IDF followed Jabari’s assassination by uploading the video of the strike to its ofﬁcial
Youtube channel: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P6U2ZQ0EhN4 (accessed 21 January
2017).
8. Gisha – Legal Center for Freedom of Movement regularly publishes updates regarding
the situation in Gaza and in particular the state of the blockade: http://gisha.org/publication
(accessed 21 January 2017).
9. Details of the process of calling civilians, along with the audio of a call made by an IDF
ofﬁcer to a civilian in Gaza is available on the IDF blog, however the call itself is in Hebrew and
it is unclear from the audio if the recipient of the call actually understands Hebrew: https://
www.idfblog.com/blog/2014/07/16/idf-done-minimize-harm-civilians-gaza/ (accessed 21
January 2017)
10. ‘Knocking on the roof’ is a practice whereby the Israeli military drops a warning bomb
on a structure marked for further airstrikes. The munition generally contains a non-explosive
warhead that penetrates the upper level of a structure. Israeli military ofﬁcials argue that the
practice serves as a warning to civilians in structures marked by a ‘knock on the roof’ to exit the
building and seek shelter before follow up air strikes.
11. IDF Blog - http://www.idfblog.com/blog/2012/11/15/how-does-the-idf-minimize-ha
rm-to-palestinian-civilians/ (accessed 21 January 2017)
12. NBC - http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/middle-east-unrest/israel-drops-leaflets-
warning-northern-gaza-airstrikes-n154571, and http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/midd
le-east-unrest/battle-ongoing-gaza-israel-leaflets-warn-n171551 (accessed 21 January 2017)
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13. Maan News - http://www.maannews.com/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?id=207440 (accessed
21 January 2017)
14. Haaretz - http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.605421 (accessed 21
January 2017)
15. IDF Blog - http://www.idfblog.com/blog/2012/11/15/how-does-the-idf-minimize-ha
rm-to-palestinian-civilians/ (accessed 21 January 2017)
16. Similar linguistic moves are evident in the language of leaﬂets dropped by Syrian and
Russian forces in advance of attempts by both militaries to retake Aleppo, Syria: https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/11/29/world/middleeast/thousands-ﬂee-onslaught-in-aleppo-as-assads-
forces-gain-ground.html?_r=1, and https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2117306/russians-drop-
warning-leaflets-ahead-of-massive-aleppo-blitz-as-terrified-families-tell-the-world-to-pray-for-us/
(accessed 21 January 2017)
17. http://www.maannews.com/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?id=207440 (accessed 21 January
2017)
18. The leaﬂet contains a typo, the Arabic word ’ayd ‛hand’, which appears to have been
misspelled in the original
19. One of the most recent examples of how seriously collaboration is dealt with in Gaza is
exempliﬁed in a case from 2014, where 18 suspected collaborators were killed by Hamas
authorities: http://www.wsj.com/articles/hamas-kills-18-alleged-collaborators-1408715295
(accessed 21 January 2017)
20. Multiple international news sources have detailed the practice of blackmailing
Palestinian residents into becoming collaborators with the Israeli military and intelligence
service. The Guardian provides one example: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/se
p/12/israeli-intelligence-unit-testimonies (accessed 21 January 2017)
21. http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/middle-east-unrest/battle-ongoing-gaza-israel-
leaflets-warn-n171551 (accessed 21 January 2017)
22. http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/7/gaza-tunnels-hamasisraelidf.html
(accessed 21 January 2017)
23. The IDF, in the period surrounding the 2014 conﬂict published numerous articles on its
ofﬁcial blog detailing what it reported was Hamas’ use of human shields: https://www.idfb
log.com/2014/08/27/hamas-terrorists-confess-using-human-shields/ (accessed 21 January
2017).
24. http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/middle-east-unrest/israel-drops-leaflets-warning-
northern-gaza-airstrikes-n154571 (accessed 21 January 2017)
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